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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LEA R. FICKLIN and MARGARET
FICKLIN, his wife,
Plaintiffs and
Appellants,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

vs.
J. RALPH MACFARLANE, M.D, and
J, R. REES, M.D.,

Case No. 14271

Defendants and
Respondents,

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a medical malpractice action based upon the alleged
failure of the defendant physicians to obtain an informed consent
from the plaintiff, Lea R. Ficklin, before performing open heart
surgery on him, in the course of which a complication occurred
resulting in serious visual deficiency, partial paralysis and
loss of memory.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury.

At the conclusion of the

plaintiffs' evidence, the Court granted defendants' motion to
dismiss because of plaintiffs' failure to establish a prima
facie case.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek affirmance of the trial court's ruling
dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
In April of 1971, plaintiff, Lea R. Ficklin, began
experiencing chest pains.

He consulted his family physician,

Dr. George Lowe, who referred him to Dr. David P. Jahsman,
a specialist in internal medicine (Tr. 231, 232). Dr. Jahsman
diagnosed his ailment as heart disease based on hardening of
the arteries, with a symptom of angina pectoris.
prescribed nitroglycerin medication.

The doctor

He also advised him to

avoid sudden strenuous exercise, but to obtain a certain amount
of regular, easy exercise on a daily basis (Tr. 284).
After the onset of the heart problem in April of 1971, Mr.
Ficklin was unable to continue his employment at Freeport (Tr.278).
Despite Dr. Jahsman1s treatment, Mr. Ficklin's condition
worsened until July 10, 1971, when he experienced a heart attack
consisting of a mild cardio infarction.

He was hospitalized at

McKay Dee Hospital for 10 days where he was placed in the
coronary care unit and given supportive treatment for pain
(Tr. 286, 287).
After his release from the hospital, Dr. Jahsman continued
to treat Mr. Ficklin.

In September of 1971, he complained of

increased chest pain and more fatigue, which concerned Dr. Jahsman
because the symptoms indicated his heart was not strengthening
after the heart attack.

At that time, the doctor suggested

that the plaintiff consider coronary artery bypass surgery
which was then quite new.

At that time the surgery hadn't been

done in Ogden, although it had been done in Salt Lake City,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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The decision was made to proceed with coronary arteriograms which are x-ray tests to determine the flow of blood through
the coronary arteries.

These tests were done at the cardio-

pulmonary laboratory at McKay Dee Hospital on October 21, 1971,
by Dr. Farrell Calton.

The arteriograms indicated complete

blockage of the left anterior descending coronary artery at a
point where it was amenable to surgical treatment (Tr. 306, 307).
The mechanics of the surgery involved opening the chest,
stopping the heart, removing a segment of vein from the patient's
leg, and attaching it to the artery in such a manner as to bypass the blocked part of the artery.

During the time required

for the operation, it was necessary to pump the patient's blood
through a cardiopulmonary bypass machine which functioned as his
heart and lungs. After the surgery was completed, the heart was
reactivated (Ex. 2, hospital records).
Dr. Jahsman discussed the risks of the surgery and the alternatives with the plaintiffs.

They were told this would be

the first time for the surgery to be done

in the Ogden area

(Tr. 288, 302). Dr. Jahsman informed Mr. Ficklin that he might
not survive the operation (Tr. 35).
In response to a question from plaintiff's counsel if it
is standard medical practice in the community for a physician or
surgeon to disclose specific risks assumed by patients undergoing
coronary bypass surgery, Dr. Jahsman testified that most physicians
would "attempt to explain broad risks without giving specific
lists of everything that could, might, or has happened as a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

complication of any given procedure (Tr. 301)."

The

Ficklins

were not informed that there was a risk of damage to the
central nervous system (apparently sustained during the surgery)
which was an extremely remote risk.

Dr. Jahsman's feeling con-

cerning the risks incurred by Mr. Ficklin was "a sort of an
all or none, that he would either survive the operation or
not survive it." The risk of damage occurring to the central
nervous system was less than one percent (Tr. 309-311).
In response to a question from plaintiffs1 counsel whether
he had discussed with the Ficklins the risk of this type of
surgery, Dr. Jahsman said:
A. In my discussion of this surgery at
that point and still at this time I!m hesitant
to recommend this type of surgery over a broad
scale. It is a means of attacking a problem, and
there are differences of opinion within the
medical profession about this. I tended to
drag my feet about proposing it to them, but
in all honesty at that point there had been
a lot of national publicity in one of the
national magazines about what a great procedure
it was, and I felt it only honest to bring this
up and discuss it with them to find out if
they were interested in it. But in my discussion with them I think I pointed out that
going upon cardiopulmonary bypass, just having
the heart bypassed itself, was a somewhat
dangerous procedure, but I did not proceed to
list all of the dangers. The surgery upon the
coronary arteries in and of itself is also a
dangerous procedure, and when the two of them
are put together as they must be it becomes
an even riskier procedure. And I believe
that I pointed out to them in a general way
that we were talking about a dangerous procedure to treat a dangerous disease (Tr. 292,
293).
The plaintiffs were aware that there would always be the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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could be fatal (Tr. 255, 256). If Mr. Ficklin didn't ha M the
surgery, his prognosis was one of continued disability; the
expectation was that over a period of time his condition would
get worse (Tr. 302, 303).
In September Dr. Jahsman had a discussion with the Ficklins
regarding the results of the arteriogram tests and the decision
was made to proceed with the surgery at that time, and to consult
with a thoracic surgeon who could perform the procedure.

The

names of a number of thoracic surgeons were discussed, including
the defendants, Drs. Macfarlane and Rees.

Dr. Jahsman told

the Ficklins that the procedure had not at that time been
performed in Ogden, and if they had any questions about being
the first case that he would put them in contact with one of
the teams in Salt Lake City who had done the procedure (Tr.
289, 290).
Even though Drs. Macfarlane and Rees had not performed
this type of surgery as a team, both were qualified cardiovascular surgeons, and had prior experience in cardiac surgery
of this type and in the use of the cardiopulmonary bypass
machine (Tr. 290, 291).
The Ficklins first met with the defendant doctors after
Mr. Ficklin was admitted to the McKay Dee Hospital and prior
to surgery, which was performed on November 3, 1971.

The defen-

dants told them what the surgical procedure would be. A comment
was made by one of the doctors that there was a risk involved
in any surgery, even an appendectomy or routine procedure. The
Ficklins knew that heart surgery was more serious than an
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Mr, Ficklin signed a consent to the operation, which was
admitted in evidence as Exhibit 1.

Both plaintiffs read it

before Mr. Ficklin signed it (Tr. 262, 273).
The operation was performed on November 3, 1971. Nothing
unusual occurred during the procedure (Ex. 2). Following the
surgery, the defendant doctors became aware that a complication
had occurred consisting of a neurological deficit, which was
manifested by impaired vision, impaired speech and paralysis on
the left side of Mr. Ficklin's body.

Dr. William R. Schmidt,

a neurologist, was called into the case as a consultant by the
defendants.

The physicians agreed that Lea Ficklin had sustained

damage to the central nervous system, but were unable to determine the actual cause of the damage.

There were a number of

things that could have caused it (Tr. 305, 314, 315).
ARGUMENT

,

,f

POINT I
THE PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THOSE RISKS WHICH A
REASONABLE PHYSICIAN IN UTAH WOULD DISCLOSE TO A PATIENT IN
SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES.
There are no Utah Supreme Court decisions on the question
of the nature and extent of the risks that must be disclosed
to a patient in order for a physician to obtain the informed
consent of his patient to a proposed surgical procedure; however,
the principle has been enunciated in prior Utah decisions that
expert medical testimony is necessary to establish the standard
of care to which a physician must adhere, except in those
Digitized bythe
the Howard
W. Hunter Law Library,
J. Reubentreatment
Clark Law School, BYU.
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common knowledge of laymen

or where there is gross neglect.

In Marsh v. Pemberton, 10 U.2d 40, 347 P.2d 1108 (1959),
a medical malpractice case dealing with alleged negligent treatment, the court stated that:

v

In the absence of a standard of care
established by expert medical testimony and
some evidence showing a deviation from this
standard it must be presumed that the physician
skillfully operated on and treated the plaintiff. To allow the question of negligence to
be submitted to the jury without first establishing a standard of care would allow a jury
to indulge in a type of speculation not generally
allowed. ... It is seldom that a doctor's standard of care, because it is too specialized, is
known or is within the knowledge of a layman.
10 U.2d 40, 44-45.

See also, Malmstrom v. Olsen, 16 U.2d 316, 400 P.2d 209 (1965),
Huggins v. Hicken, 310 P.2d 523, 6 U.2d 233 (1957), Anderson
v. Nixon, 104 Utah 262, 139 P.2d 216 (1943), Baxter v. Snow,
78 Utah 217, 2 P.2d 257 (1931).
The rationale requiring expert testimony in a medical
malpractice action involving an allegation of improper diagnosis
or treatment is equally applicable to such an action brought under
the theory of lack of informed consent.

A physician possesses

and exercises skills and knowledge beyond those of the layman
and must therefore be judged by a different standard.

The same

skill and knowledge applied in diagnosis and treatment of an
injury or illness must necessarily be applied by a physician
in the decisions to disclose or not to disclose to the perhaps
critically ill patient the need for treatment, the risks involved,
the likelihood
of success and the available alternatives.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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i

can properly evaluate.

Such factors include the likely effect

of the disclosure on the patient's condition and the amount of
risk to the patient considering his medical history.

As testified

by Dr. Jahsman a "judgment decision" is required of the physician
as to the surgical risks of which a patient should be informed
(Tr. 303-305).

In this instance, the Ficklins and Dr. Jahsman

had made the decision to have the surgery performed; the only
question was whether it should be done by Drs. Macfarlane and Rees,
or by physicians practicing in Salt Lake City.
The majority of the courts that have dealt with informed
consent have held that expert testimony must be produced by a
plaintiff in order to establish both the existence and the
extent of a doctor's duty to inform his patient of treatment
alternatives and material risks of those alternatives. 52 ALR3d
1084.
i

In Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, rehearing
denied, 354 P.2d 670, 187 Kan. 186 (1960), a case dealing with
the failure of a physician to give any information whatever to
i

a patient regarding the hazards of proposed radiation treatment,
the court ruled that expert testimony was unnecessary to establish breach of duty.

However, the court further stated that
... i

where some disclosure of risks is made to a patient the following rule is applicable:
The duty of the physician to disclose,
however, is limited to those disclosures
which a reasonable medical practitioner
would make under the same or similar
circumstances. How the physician may
best
his
the BYU.
Digitized discharge
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patient in this difficult situation
involves primarily a question of
medical judgment. So long as the disclosure is sufficient to assure an informed consent, the physician's choice
of plausible courses should not be called
into question if it appears, all circumstances considered, that the physician was
motivated only by the patient's best
therapeutic interests and he proceeded
as competent medical men would have done
in a similar situation. (Emphasis added)
350 P.2d 1093, 1106.
The Natanson court quoted with approval from the 1957
California case, Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University
Board of Trustees, 157 Cal. App.2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957).
That quotation is here set out in full in order to clarify
the partial quotation recited in appellants' brief at page 3:
A physician violates his duty to his
patient and subjects himself to liability
if he withholds any facts which are
necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent by the patient to the proposed
treatment. Likewise, the physician may not
minimize the known dangers of a procedure or
operation in order to induce his patient's
consent. At the same time, the physician
must place the welfare of his patient above
all else and this very fact places him in a
position in which he sometimes must choose
between two alternative courses of action.
One is to explain to the patient every risk
attendant upon any surgical procedure or
operation, no matter how remote; this may
well result in alarming a patient who is
already unduly apprehensive and who may as
a result refuse to undertake surgery in
which there is in fact minimal risk; it may
also result in actually increasing the risks
by reason of the psychological results of
the apprehension itself. The other is to
recognize that each patient presents a separate
problem, that the patient's mental and emotional condition is important and i n certain
cases may be crucial, and that in discussing
the
element of risk, a certain amount of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the full disclosure of facts necessary to
an informed consent. 350 P.2d 1093, 1104.
This viewpoint, allowing maximum flexibility for the
physician to exercise his medical judgment in the patient's
interest consistent with the patient's right to have risks of
a procedure explained

is expressed in subsequent Kansas cases.

In Charley v. Cameron, 215 Kan. 750, 528 P.2d 1205 (1974)
the court affirmed a judgment for a physician who used forceps
to deliver a baby which was injured during the birth, after
advising the parents of some, but not all, of the risks involved.
The court said that in these circumstances expert testimony is
ordinarily necessary to establish that the disclosures made
are insufficient to accord with disclosures made by reasonable
medical practitioners under the same or similar circumstances.
Tatro v. Lueken, 212 Kan. 606, 512 P.2d 529 (1973) involved
a physician's decision not to tell a patient about a minimal risk
of a particular surgical procedure; the court affirmed judgment
for the physician and, quoting a prior Kansas decision, stated
that:
At no time has this court ventured to
say that a physician or surgeon is under
obligation to disclose any and all results
which might possibly follow a medical or
surgical procedure. Nor would we row deny
that there may well be circumstances under
which it would be bad therapeutic practice
to disclose the nature, the procedures and
the possible harsh results of treatment.
512 P.2d 529, 538.

^

The following jurisdictions from adjacent states adhere to
the majorityDigitized
position:
Stundon v. Stadnik, 469 P.2d 16 (1970,
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(1968), Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App. 358, 409 P.2d 74
(1965), Mallett v. Pirkey, 171 Colo. 271, 466 P.2d 466 (1970),
Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408 (1974, CA 5).
In this case, the plaintiffs were aware of the risk of death
as a complication of this very serious open-heart surgery, which
had never been performed in Ogden and was a new type of surgery
being done in the nation.

They were also aware of the alter-

natives to having the surgery: continued disability with the
ever present hazard of another and possibly fatal heart attack.
The following exchange took place between plaintiffs'
counsel and Dr. Jahsman regarding the standard practice in the
community for disclosure of risks in the type of heart surgery
involved:
Q. Do you know, Dr. Jahsman, if it is standard
medical practice in this community for a physician
or surgeon to disclose specific risks that a patient
is assuming and undertaking when they undergo this
type of surgery?
***

A. I believe most of us will attempt to explain
broad risks without giving specific lists of everything that could, might or has happened asa complication of any given procedure (Tr. 301).
***

On cross-examination, Dr. Jahsman testified:
Q. Now, doctor, as to the risks that a physician
discusses with a patient prior to surgery, that
depends to a great extent upon particular circumstances,
does it not; that is, a patient's condition and whether
he is worried about the surgery and the inherent or
probable risks as distinguished from remote risks;
are all those factors you have to take into consideration?
A. Yes.
Digitized by
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risk, which was not as distinguished from a probable
risk; isnft that right, sir?
A. This gets to be a matter of how much time we
can take explaining risks to patients when you mention
remote as opposed to probable.
Q. In fact, there is some danger in mentioning
remote risks and going through all the possible risks
and causing the patient harm by increasing his
worry or stress about the operation, is there not?
A.

This is conceivable.

Q. Yes, and so it has to be a judgment decision
on the part of the doctor as to just what risks he
discusses with the patient, isn't that right, sir?
A. Yes.
Q. And I suppose that there is a rule there are
no two patients alike--some are more concerned, more
worried than others?
A. Correct......
Q. And they all vary as to the physical reactions
and the ability they have to withstand the stress of
operations, I suppose?
. .
. •,
A.

Correct.

(Tr. 304-305).

.

In a recent Fifth Circuit decision the court's discussion
is particularly appropriate in light of the foregoing testimony
from the present case.

The court in Karp v. Cooley, supra,

affirmed a directed verdict for the defendant doctor on the
issue of informed consent.

There, a mechanical heart was

implanted in the chest of a patient with severe heart disease.
The patient's widow filed suit claiming that neither she nor
her husband had been advised of the experimental nature of
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
the surgicalDigitized
procedure.
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After stating that "(p)hysicians and surgeons have a
duty to make a reasonable disclosure to a patient of risks that
are incident to medical diagnosis and treatment" (citations
omitted) and that "(t)rue consent to what happens to one's
self is the informed exercise of a choice, and that entails
an opportunity to evaluate knowledgably the options available
and the risks attendant upon each," 493 F.2d 408, 419, (citing
Canterbury v. Spence), the court set forth the following rationale
for requiring expert testimony as to what a reasonable practitioner would disclose to a patient:
The question to be determined by the
jury is whether the defendant doctor in
that particular situation failed to adhere
to a standard of reasonable care. These are
not matters of common knowledge or within
the experience of layment. Expert medical
evidence thereon is just as necessary as
is such testimony on the correctness of the
handling in cases involving surgery or
treatment . . . Without the aid of expert
medical testimony . . .' a jury could not,
without resorting to conjecture and surmise
or by setting up an arbitrary standard of
their own, determine that defendants
failed to exercise their skill and use
the_ care exercised by the ordinarily
skillful, careful and prudent physician
acting under the same or similar circumstances . ; . The question is not what,
regarding the risks involved, the juror
would relate to the patient under the same
or similar circumstances, or even what a
reasonable man would relate, but what a
reasonable medical practitioner would do.
Such practitioner would consider the
state of the patientfs health, the condition
of his heart and nervous system, his mental
state, and would take into account, among
other things, whether the risks involved
were remote possibilities or something which
occurred with some sort of frequency or regu^
larity.
This determination involves medical
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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risks may have such an adverse effect on
the patient as to jeopardize success of the
proposed therapy, no matter how expertly performed. (Emphasis added) supra at p. 420.

^

In Karp, nine doctors testified but no standard of disclosure was set forth for such an experimental operation, and,

'

thus, there was no testimony as to what risks under these circumstances a physician should disclose.

In this analogous

situation, Dr. Jahsman testified:
Q. Do you have knowledge, sir, as to
whether or not this type of pulmonary bypass
operation had ever been performed in Ogden,
Utah prior to November 3, 1971?
A.

'

.

I knew that it had not.

Q. So you don't know what the standard of
informing them of what the risks would be in
this community at that time; is that correct,
sir?

i
%

A. If you're starting on new grounds why
I guess we have to accept the rules as we sent
along in that case.
None of the physicians were able to determine the actual cause
of the complication experienced by the plaintiff; not knowing
the cause, there was no way in which the physicians could be
i

reasonably expected to foresee damage to the central nervous
system as a probable risk.
The plaintiffs' brief cites Canterbury v. Spence, 150 App.
I

D.C. 263, 464 F.2d 772 (1972) as being representative of the
minority view that expert medical testimony is not necessai;' to
establish the required standard disclosure in informed consent
cases.

That case involved a young patient who became paralyzed

after a surgical procedure which the treating physician described
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to the patient's mother as "no more serious than any other

No statement whatever of any risks was given to the patient
or his mother.

In addition, the District of Columbia had a

line of cases, contrary to the prevailing rule in Utah, that
the reasonableness of a medical procedure is not defined
the prevailing medical practice.

by

The failure of the physician

in that case to relate any risks of the procedure and the previous
case law in the jurisdiction in which this case arose distinguishes
Canterbury v. Spence from the instant case.
Cobbs v. Grant, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 502 P.2d 1 (1972) is
another widely cited minority case in which the court reversed
a judgment against a physician inasmuch as the general verdict
did not make clear whether or not the jury found that the physician
had negligently performed an operation to remove a duodenal
ulcer or whether he had negligently failed to inform the patient
of the risks involved.

The court found no evidence of negligence

in the performance of the operation.
Explaining that the issue of informed consent was likely
to arise on re-trial, the court, by dicta, discussed informed
consent.

In that court's opinion, where a complicated surgical

procedure is involved, a medical doctor has a duty to disclose
to his patient the potential for death or serious harm.
Beyond the foregoing minimal disclosure,
a doctor must also reveal to his patient
such additional information as a skilled
practitioner of good standing would provide
under similar circumstances. ... The scope
of the physician's communications to the
patient, then, must be measured by the
patient's need, and that need is whatever information is material to the deciDigitized by the
Howard W.the
Hunter Law
Library,
J. Reuben
Clark Law School, BYU.
sion.
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i
is its materiality to the patient's decision.
(Citing Canterbury vs. Spence) 502 P.2d 1, 11.
Apparently, because the court was giving general instructions
to the trial court for re-trial, the court did not provide
guidelines for determining what is a "material11 risk.
It is important to note that in Cobbs, as in Canterbury,
none of the inherent risks of the operation were disclosed to
the patient.
In the present case, the plaintiffs failed to produce expert
testimony as to what additional risks, if any, beyond the risk
of death, should have been disclosed to them by the defendant
doctors.

In the absence of such testimony, the Court properly

dismissed the plaintiffs1 Complaint.

To do otherwise would have

forced the jury to in effect make a medical judgment based on
speculation.

The only medical evidence regarding the disclosure

of risks of medical procedures in Utah was Dr. Jahsmanfs testimony that broad risks of Many given procedure" are explained to
a patient.

As in Karp, supra, there was no testimony as to what
i

risks a physician would disclose in similar circumstances.

Without

a standard to guide them, the jury could only speculate whether
the disclosure to the Ficklins satisfied the defendant doctors'
duty.
POINT II
THE DEFENDANTS HAD NO DUTY TO DISCLOSE TO THE PLAINTIFFS
EXTREMELY REMOTE RISKS OF THE CONTEMPLATED SURGICAL PROCEDURE.
The plaintiffs argue that the risk of central nervous
damage was a material risk that the defendant doctors had a
Hntv

+r\
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is not required to define materiality.

This view is not

supportable when the question of the materiality of a risk
is considered in detail and in relation to a specific factual
situation.
What is or is not a material risk
depends upon the facts of the particular
case. The only risks which a doctor must
disclose are those inherent in the procedure he proposes. He need not disclose
unexpected risks that may arise in connection
with the procedure, or risks which may be a
remote possibility as distinguished from a
probability. Louisell and Williams, Medical
Malpractice, Vol. 2, Sec. 2205.
The appellants1 brief cites Holland v. Sisters of St.
Joseph of Peace, Oregon, 522 P.2d 208, (1974) for the proposition
that expert testimony is not required to show materiality of
risk.

In fact, that decision stands for the proposition that

expert testimony is required before the question of materiality
can be considered by the jury, and it provides guidelines for
determining what minimum testimony must be present before a jury
may judge whether a defendant physician has failed in his duty
to advise a patient of material risks.

Those guidelines have

particular relevance to the instant case.
In Holland the plaintiff alleged that she was not informed
by the treating physicians that proposed radiation treatment
involved dangers of serious injury to healthy organs. Quoting
a prior Oregon case, Getchell v. Mansfield, 260 Or. 174,
489 P.2d 953 (1971) the court said:
When medical testimony has been introduced
showing that the risk is material,
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the patient, the duty to warn and
alternatives is not based upon the
physicians in the locality. 522
208, 209,

The court went on to say that:

t

The factors which determine the significance
of the risk are the incidence of the injury
from a certain treatment and the degree of
harm that might be involved. ... If a serious
injury might occur from a given method of
treatment, the physician must inform the
patient of all but extremely remote risks.
(Emphasis added). 522 P.2d 208, 212.

I

If the incidence and seriousness of potential injuries as

*

a result of proposed surgical procedure must be shown by expert
testimony and if extremely remote risks need not be related, it
follows that where the only expert testimony is that a particular

j

risk of a surgical procedure is extremely remote, there is nothing
for the jury to decide--there is no requirement that the patient
be informed of such remote risks.

M

Dr. Jahsman, the only expert witness who gave an opinion
as to the risks involved in the type of surgery performed on
Lea Ficklin testified as follows upon re-direct examination:
Q. In the case of Lea Ficklin, and
your understanding of his medical condition
at the time that you referred him to Doctors
Macfarlane and Rees, did you consider the
risk of damage to the central nervous system
a remote risk?
A.

I

Extremely remote.

Q. Did you consider the loss of vision,
memory or paralysis as a remote risk?
A.

|

Very much.

Very remote.
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Q. What did you understand the risks
to be on the surgery on Mr. Ficklin at that
time?
A. My major feeling of the risk was a
sort of all or none, that he would either
survive the operation or not survive it
(Tr. 309, 310).
Q. In your experience, did you become
aware of any damage to the central nervous
system as a result of this procedure?
***

A. When I was a resident in Detroit, we
had a very active heart surgery team, and
I can recall in the three years I was there
I saw one case. The percentage, I have no
idea, but it was less than one percent
(Tr. 310, 311).
In Mason v. Ellsworth, 474 P.2d 909, 3 Wash. App. 298
(1970), the court reversed a judgment for the defendant doctor
on other grounds but, addressing the issue of informed consent,
stated that the injury sustained, a punctured esophagus, was
not a reasonably foreseeable risk of the surgical procedure
performed inasmuch as it occurred in Mat most 3/4 of one percent
(.75%)" of the surgical procedures involved. 474 P.2d 909, 919.
In Getchell, supra, a patient diagnosed as having a separated
shoulder, had the parts of the shoulder joined with wires in a
surgical procedure performed by one of the defendant doctors.
The court struck from the complaint allegations that the
defendants failed to advise the patient of the risks of the
procedure.
Discussing the evidence required to show what, if any,
risks must be disclosed, the court said:
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Materiality is an issue which in most
instances will require expert medical
testimony. For example, does an infection
and loss of vision occur after a cataract
operation sufficiently often that a patient
deciding whether to undergo such surgery
should be advised of this possibility?
Or, in the present case, what are the
chances of the wires breaking and what
will happen if they do break? These
are matters about which medical testimony
is essential. 489 P.2d 953, 956.
One of the defendant doctors, Dr. Hiestand, was called

as an adverse witness by the plaintiff and his was the only
expert testimony in the case directed to the materiality of
the risks involved.

He said that:

The breaking of the wires was not a
"general riskM of using the wiring procedure.
He stated they would not break if they were
not subjected to too much strain. Supra at
page 957.
The court found that this testimony was not sufficient
evidence that the breaking of the wires was a material risk
of the surgical procedure.
The plaintiffs in their brief on appeal cite Cooper v.
Roberts, 220

Pa. Super. 260, 286 A.2d 647 (1971) for the

proposition that even a minute risk of a surgical procedure must
be dislosed to a patient.

In that case, the patient was hospi-

talized for examination of a suspicious growth in her hernia
and the examination was conducted by means of the insertion of
a 1/4M diameter fiberglass instrument in the patient's stomach.
The incidence of perforation of the stomach wall by the
instrument was 1/2500 or .0004 percent.

The patient's stomach
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court's judgment in favor of the defendant doctors.

Contrary

to the decisions in all of the leading cases in recent years
which have addressed this problem, the superior court propounded the rule that an operation performed without informed
consent is a technical assualt, and it therefore imposed a
strict standard for disclosure upon the defendant physicians.
It is important to note that in Cooper the evidence showed
that the plaintiff was never informed of any risks attendant on
the operation.

M

0n one occasion (the plaintiff) was assured

that 'the examination was a relatively simple diagnostic
procedure and that (there) should not be any trouble with
it.'" 286 A.2d 647, 648.
The court's decision in Cooper is not applicable to the
fact situation in the present case where the risk of death was
disclosed to the plaintiffs, who then elected to proceed with
the operation.

Where the most serious risk possible, death,

is disclosed to a patient, it would be unreasonable to place
upon a physician the burden of disclosing very minimal risks
which are remote and cannot reasonably be anticipated.
The Utah Legislature has, in effect, established as
public policy in this state that physicians are not under a
duty to disclose remote risks of a medical procedure to their
patients.

In its 1976 budget session the legislature enacted

- the "Utah Health Care Malpractice Act" which codifies the
elements of proof in a medical malpractice action based upon
a claim of lack of informed consent.

Section 6 (1) (d) of
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be dependent, inter alia, upon a showing by the patient that
"the health care rendered carried with it a substantial and
significant risk of causing the patient serious harm. ...ff
Section 6(2)(a) sets forth the following as a defense to such
an action:

"A risk of the serious harm which the patient

actually suffered was relatively minor. ..."
While this legislative action is not binding in actions
arising out of an operation performed prior to the passage of the
Act, the language clearly supports the defendants1 assertion that
{

physicians should not be required to discuss every risk of a
proposed procedure, where the probability of the complication
is minimal.
POINT III
THE PLAINTIFFS DID NOT PROVE THAT THE DEFENDANTS' FAILURE
TO INFORM THEM OF RISKS IN ADDITION TO THE RISK OF DEATH WAS
THE CAUSE OF THE INJURIES SUSTAINED BY LEA FICKLIN.
i

The burden of proof of proximate cause is upon the plaintiffs.
In Shetter v. Rochelle, supra, the court asserted that:
. . .(U)nder malpractice theories, there
would be no damage proximately resulting from
the failure to disclose unless the plaintiff
would not have had the operation if the
disclosure had been made. ... One expression
of this rule is by Dean Prosser:
On the other hand, an act or omission
is not regarded as a cause of an event
if the particular event would have occurred
without it. Prosser, Torts, (3d ed.) P. 242.
A plaintiff must not only prove that a physician failed
to make a reasonable disclosure of risks involved in proposed
surgery, but also that the patient would not have consented
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to the nrocedure had ^ been given all of the information regarding

anticipated possible hazards.

Dowe v. Permente Medical Group,

90 Cal. Rptr. 747, 12 Cal. App.2d 488.
The plaintiffs here both testified that they would not
have consented to the operation had they been advised that a
risk of the operation was central nervous system damage, including
partial paralysis and blindness.

While the plaintiffs were

properly permitted to testify from "hindsight" as to what their
decision would have been, such testimony did not compel submission of the plaintiffs' case to the jury.

Such testimony

is not controlling since the test of whether or not a patient
in a particular situation would have consented to a proposed
procedure is objective—what would a

prudent person in the

patient's position have decided with adequate disclosure.
Funke v. Fieldman, 212 Kan. 524, 512 P.2d 539 (1973), Cobbs
v. Grant, supra, Holt v. Nelson, 523 P.2d 211, Wash. App. (1974).
Another court has said:
. . .(W)here the patient fully appreciates
the danger involved, the failure of a physician
in his duty to make a reasonable disclosure to
the patient would have no causal relationship
to the injury. In such event the consent of
the patient to the proposed treatment is an
informed consent. The burden of proof rests
throughout the trial of the case upon the
patient who seeks to recover in a malpractice
action for her injury. Natanson v. Kline, supra,
350 P.2d 1093, 1106.
Likewise, the California court in Canterbury v. Spence,
supra, said that:
If adequate disclosure could reasonably
be expected to have caused that person to
decline the treatment because of the revelation
of
the
kind
of risk
that
Digitized by the
Howard
W. Hunter
Law Library,
J. Reubenor
Clark danger
Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated
OCR, sat-inn
may contain errors.
resulted in
harm, can
TC cv»^r^ u,,4.

A review of the testimony of the plaintiffs as to what
risks they were aware of and as to what the alternatives to
the proposed surgical procedure were demonstrates clearly that
a jury could not reasonably find that the plaintiffs would have
refused to consent to the proposed operation if additional risks
had been revealed to them.

Their testimony was that they were

aware that the procedure carried with it the risk of death.
They were also aware that in the absence of the surgical procedure
Mr. Ficklin could be stricken with a second heart attack at any
time which could be fatal.
The plaintiffs1 testimony born of hindsight that Lea
Ficklin would not have consented to the operation had the
plaintiffs known of the Mextremely remote1' risk of central
nervous system damage is not reasonable or probative evidence.
If a surgeon can be held responsible for not informing a patient
of the infinite variety of remote complications which can and
do result from major surgery, applying

tf

20-20 vision of hindsight"

after the event, the issue of informed consent would always
involve a question of fact resulting in an intolerable burden
on the medical profession.

Again, in this instance, Dr. Jahsman,

the plaintiffs1 attending physician, testified he believed the
operation was a nsort of all or none, that he would survive the
operation or not survive it."
CONCLUSION
The trial court properly dismissed the plaintiffs'
complaint.
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The plaintiffs failed to present expert testimony as to
the standard of disclosure required of a reasonable medical
practitioner in circumstances similar to those involved in this
lawsuit.

Without such a standard before them, the jury could

not be expected to judge the materiality of the risks which
were disclosed to the plaintiffs.
The defendant physicians did not have a duty to disclose
all possible risks, including extremely remote risks, of the
proposed surgical procedure to the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs failed to bear their burden of showing, in
light of all the facts available to them, particularly the risk
of death, that they would not have consented to the coronary
bypass operation had they been advised of a remote risk of
central nervous sytem damage.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /7

day of February, 1976.

HANSON, WADSWORTH $ RUSSON
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Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents
702 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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